U.S. and Pakistan: With Musharraf Fading, What Comes Next?

The White House is encouraged that the Pakistani military is no fan of al Qaeda. Still, relations between the two nations need repair.

By Andrew C. Schneider, Associate Editor, The Kiplinger Letter

February 26, 2008

Pakistan's recent election outcome won't wreck U.S.-Pakistani ties. In fact, there's a good chance the relationship will improve in the aftermath of President Pervez Musharraf's electoral drubbing. The strong victory by secular parties in the parliamentary races, particularly in the Pashtun-dominated region bordering Afghanistan, points up the country's determination to fight Islamist extremism.

But the U.S. will have to work hard to earn Pakistanis' trust, given the White House's long embrace of Musharraf. Bush's support for the ex-military dictator has undercut his rhetoric of promoting democracy.

The U.S.' image among ordinary Pakistanis has plummeted in recent years, more so as Musharraf directed the use of U.S.-supplied weapons against tribal militants, the Pakistani Taliban and other Pakistani Islamists.

That led many observers to comment on similarities between U.S. support for Musharraf since September 2001 and U.S. support for the Shah of Iran in the quarter-century leading up to Iran's Islamic Revolution. "I don't think the situation with Musharraf will parallel the situation with the Shah," says Akbar Ahmed, Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies at American University, referring to the violently anti-American turn Iran took after 1979. "But it's not for lack of trying."

Much of the solution will lie in redirecting foreign aid, focusing far more funds on badly needed social infrastructure, such as education and health care. That would improve the U.S. image in the nation. More importantly, it would strengthen the institutions of secular government by providing alternative sources for services that, for many, are available only from Islamist organizations.

The military side of the relationship will remain important, though. The Pakistani Army can't mount a large-scale counterinsurgency against the Taliban anytime soon. But the pro-U.S. commanding general, Ashfaq Kayani, is highly capable of mounting special operations missions, and he's proving more willing than Musharraf ever was to confront Islamist tribal militants. That's likely to make a major difference in targeting al Qaeda leadership lurking near the Afghan border.

As for Musharraf himself, his days in office are numbered. The Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) would still need to add a few smaller parties and independents to their ruling coalition to get to the magic number of 182 votes. That's the two-thirds majority needed either to impeach the president or to amend the constitution -- including a reversal of the amendment Musharraf pushed through last year allowing him to run for another term.

But the ruling coalition won't need such a margin in order to render Musharraf politically irrelevant. The Majlis-e-Shoora, Pakistan's parliament, will pass legislation asserting its authority over the presidency the first time it disagrees with Musharraf on any significant issue. Such a disagreement is virtually inevitable, according to Kamran Bokhari, director of Middle East analysis for private intelligence firm Stratfor. "If it comes to a clash, Musharraf will lose," says Bokhari. The president would then have the choice of staying on as a figurehead or resigning.

Unlike in his previous conflicts with the parliament, Musharraf would not have the army to intervene on his behalf. The military remains Pakistan's most powerful national institution and the ultimate arbiter of its politics. But Gen. Kayani is determined to keep the army above the fray this time. The fact that it refused to intervene in the election itself is the strongest evidence of this.

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