Russia's Invasion of Georgia

Moscow's use of brute force in its own backyard underscores the limits of U.S. power in a multipolar world.

By Andrew C. Schneider, Associate Editor, The Kiplinger Letter

August 11, 2008

Russia’s invasion of Georgia is a black eye for the U.S., the European Union and NATO. The U.S. can do little more than protest Russia's military action in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as in Georgia proper. The Bush administration's efforts to get a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning Russia's military actions will come to naught: Moscow is certain to use its veto to block any such motion. Nor will the Kremlin go along with U.S. and French efforts to secure a truce that reaffirms Georgia's prewar borders.

A small U.S. contingent of military advisers is in the ex-Soviet state, a thank-you for Georgia’s sending troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. And the U.S. is currently flying Georgia's 2000-troop Iraq contingent -- the third largest foreign troop deployment in the country -- back home. Beyond such measures, there's little the U.S. can do to help Georgia. Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan leave the U.S. with no troops available for a display of force in the Caucasus.

Although the Bush administration has recently attempted to restrain the Georgians from taking any actions likely to provoke a Russian response, previous pronouncements of U.S. support may well have led Georgia’s president, Mikheil Saakashvili, to believe that the U.S. and NATO would come to his rescue if need be. The U.S. has been one of the staunchest supporters of Georgian democracy and Georgian independence from Moscow since the country's Rose Revolution of 2003, and the U.S. put its credibility on the line last spring when President Bush lobbied for full NATO membership for Georgia.

As a result, potential allies are less likely to take the U.S. at its word on statements of support, particularly when they risk standing up against stronger neighbors. What’s more, the war illustrates just how far the U.S. has moved from its post-Cold War position as the world’s sole superpower. Russia's success in its war with Georgia does not indicate the Kremlin's return as a global rival to the U.S. But it does serve as a brutal reminder that the U.S. is now living in a multipolar world.

As one of those poles, Russia is in a far greater position to shape events in its neighborhood than the U.S. Other countries in Russia’s “near abroad” are already sliding closer into its orbit: Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are suspending oil shipments through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, a transit route for shipping oil from Central Asia and the Caucasus to Europe without going through Russia. Moreover, the only ex-Soviet state that has openly shown any support for the Georgians is Ukraine, which has its own territorial disputes with Moscow.

"It looks like the Russians aren't interested in a cease-fire. They're interested in surrender," says Stephen Sestanovich, George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. At a minimum, the Russians are determined to permanently kick Georgia out of the two separatist provinces as a prelude to annexing both Russian-majority territories. Beyond this, they may also seek to create a lasting buffer zone, demilitarizing or occupying portions of Georgia itself. Their capture of Gori and their blockade of Poti -- staging areas for Georgian military activity in South Ossetia and Abkhazia -- put them in a position to do just that. Gori is just 40 miles from Tbilisi. Should the Russians choose to move on the capital, they would almost certainly take it as well, putting Russia in a position to oust Georgia's pro-Western president.

"Georgia has always been the easternmost point of Western influence, and it looks like the Russians want to expunge that," says Peter Zeihan, director of global analysis for private intelligence firm Stratfor. The longer U.S. military advisers remain in Georgia and transport flights continue, the greater the chances that Russian attacks outside South Ossetia will lead to U.S. casualties.

Europe remains divided. France, which currently holds the EU presidency, is actively pushing both sides to accept a cease-fire while trying to keep Europe neutral. In contrast, member states closer to the Russian border-- former Eastern Bloc states such as Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but also Finland and Sweden -- want the union to take a firm stand against Russia. Even if the EU could take a common position, most of its available ground forces are committed as part of the NATO mission in Afghanistan.

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